Simmons v. Superior Court In and For Santa Barbara County by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection
6-24-1959
Simmons v. Superior Court In and For Santa
Barbara County
Roger J. Traynor
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Simmons v. Superior Court In and For Santa Barbara County 52 Cal.2d 373 (1959).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/803
June 1959] SIMM.ONS V. SUPERIOR COURT 
152 C.W 373: 341 P.1d 131 
[L. A. No. 25320. In Bank. JUDe 24, 1959.] 
373 
C. K. SIMMONS, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OJ.<' 
SANTA BARBARA COUNTY, Respondent; SANTA 
BARBARA ICE AND COLD STORAGE COMPANY 
(a Corporation) et al., Real Parties in Interest. 
[1] Certiorari- When Writ Lies. - Certiorari is available only 
when it can be shown that an inferior court has exceeded its 
jurisdiction and that there is no appeal or any plain, speedy 
and adequate remedy open to the party seeking the writ. (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 1068.) 
[2] ld.-When Writ Lies-Remedy by Appeal.-A writ of certi-
orari will not issue if petitioner had a right of appeal from the 
ordl'r or judgment in question lll1d permitted the time to lapse 
without perfecting an appeal. 
[3] ld.-When Writ Liea-Remedy by Appeal.-Certiorari will not 
lie to review an order dismissing petitioner's action after de-
fendants' demurrer was sustained with leave to amend and 
petitioner had failed to amend his complaint within the time 
allowed, where he failed to take his appeal within 60 days of 
the date the order of dismissal was entered, offered no excuse 
for his failure to do so except that he did not have actual 
knowledge of the court's ruling, and offered no explanation for 
his failure to discover the court's order until nearly five months 
after the time for appeal had expired, except that the clerk 
sent no notice. 
[4] ld.-When Writ Lies-Remedy by Appeal.-A plaintiff was 
not entitled to notice of an order dismissing his action after a 
hearing on the motion to dismiss and the fact that he did not 
have actual notice of the court's ruling is immaterial and no 
excuse for failure to avail himself of the remedy of appeal 
within the time required by law. 
[5] ld.-When Writ Lies-Remedy by Appeal.-It is a litigant's 
duty to protect his own record in each step of the proceedings, 
and his failure to do so, in the absence of reasonable justifica-
tion, does not entitle him to an extension of the time for 
appeal by resort to a writ of certiorari. 
[6a,6b] Dismissal-Order-Entry.-The trial court did not exceed 
its jurisdiction in causing an order of dismissal to be entered 
in the minutes by oral direction from chambers where the 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Certiorllri, § 11 et setl.; Am.Jur., Certiorari, 
t;j et seq. 
McK. Dig. References; [1] Certiorari, § 9; [2-5] Certiorari, § 36; 
[6] Dismissal, § 33; [7] Courts, § 112; [8] Motions, § 20. 
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order was entered in the minutes of the court on the same day 
the motion to dismiss was made, after the matter had been 
properly noticed and a hearing had been hnd in which the 
parties appeared, in accordance with the judge's instructions 
to his clerk. No formal writing signed by the court and filed 
with the clerk is necessary. 
[7] Courts - Decisions as Precedents.-Incidental statements or 
conclusions not necessary to the decision are not to be regarded 
as authority. 
[8] Motions-Orders-Entry· and Filing.-The act of instructing 
the clerk to enter an order in the minutes, whether in chambers 
or on the bench, followed by entry in the minutes is the 
equivalent of signing a formal order and filing it with tho 
clerk. 
PROCEEDING in certiorari to revie,v an order of the 
Superior Court of Santa Barbara Connty dismissing peti-
tioner's action after defendants' demurrer was sustained with 
leave to amend and petitioner failed to amend within the time 
allowed. Order affirmed. 
Price, Postel & Parma, H. Clarke Gaines and Gerald S. 
Thede for Petitioner. 
No appearance for Respondent. 
Griffith & Thornburgh and Laselle Thornburgh for Real 
Parties in Interest. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner commenced an action in the 
respondent court against the Santa Barbara Ice and Cold 
Storage Company and others. After the defendants' de-
murrer to a second amended complaint was sustained with 
leave to amend, a "Notice of Motion to Dismiss" was filed on 
the ground that petitioner had failed to amend his complaint 
Within the time allowed by the court. The matter came on for 
hearing on August 27, 1956. Petitioner appeared at the 
hearing and stated that he elected to stand on the pleadings, 
but opposed the motion on the ground that the" demurrer had 
been improperly sustained. The court then stated that it 
desired to check the 1l1e, and after doing so instructed the 
clerk, in chambers, that the. motion to dismiss wa.'! granted. 
(7] See Oal.Jur.2d, Courts, § 143; Am.Jur., Courts, § 83. 
[8] See Cal.Jur.2d, Motions, Rules and Ol·d('f!:;, § 17; Am.Jur., 
MotioDS, Rules and Orders, § 29. 
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'l'he order was entered in the minutes of the court on the 
same day. No notice appears to have been given petitioner 
or his counsel of the fact that the motion had been granted, 
and he states that he did not learn of the dismissal until 
March 18, 1957, almost five months after the time for appeal 
had expired. In this proceeding, petitioner seeks certiorari 
to review the order of dismissal on the grounds that the re-
spondent court exceeded its jurisdiction by causing the order ' 
of dismissal to be entered in this manner, and that since he 
had no notice of the fact that the order had been entered, 
the remedy of appeal was not available to him. . I 
[1] Certiorari is available only when it can be shown that 
an inferior court has exceeded its jnrisdiction and that" there 
is no appeal; nor . . . any plain, speedy and adequate 
remedy" open to the party seeking the writ. (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1068; Noble v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. 523, 526 [42 P. 
155]; Olcese v. Justice's Court, 156 Cal. 82, 84-88 [103 P. 
317] ; Leach v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. 531, 534-535 [12 P. 
2d 1] ; Ivory v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.2d 455, 459-460 [85 
P..2d 894] ; Redlands etc. Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 
2d 348,351 [125 P.2d 490].) [2] The writ will not issue if 
the petitioner had a right of appeal from the order or judg-
ment in question and permitted the time to lapse without per-
fecting an appeal. If there was an opportunity to appeal . 
and it was lost through the neglect of the aggrieved party, 
the subsequent absence of this remedy cannot be asserted as 
a reason for issuing the writ. (Leach v. Superior Court, 215 
Cal. 531, 534-535 [12 P.2d 1]; State Bd. of EquaZization v. 
Su,perior Court, 9 Cal.2d 252, 255 [70 P.2d 482].; 1'1)0'11 v. 
Superior Court, 12 Cal.2d 455, 459-460 [85 P.2d 894]; 
HowaZdt v. Superior Court, 18 Ca1.2d 114, 116-117 [114 P.2d 
333] ; Phelan v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.2d 363, 370-371 [217 
P.2d 951].) 
[3] Under these rules it is clear that certiorari is not 
available to petitioner. The record shows that the order of 
dismissal was entered on August 27, 1956, and that petitioner 
was required to take his appeal within 60 days of that date. 
He offers no excuse for his failure to do so except that he did 
not have actual knowledge of the court's ruling. He offers 
no explanation for his failure to discover the court's order 
until March 18, 1957, except that the clerk did not send him 
notice. Such circumstances do not justify an exception to the 
general rules. 
) 
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[4] Petitioner was not entitled by law to any notice of the 
court's ruling, and the fact that he did not have actual notice 
of the ruling is therefore immaterial. (Arens v. Superior 
. Court, 45 Cal.2d 623, 625 [290 P.2d 257].) [5] It is a liti- I 
gant's duty to protect his own record in each step of the 
proceedings, and his failure to do so, in the absence of reaSOIl-
able justification, does not entitle him to an extension of the 
time for appeal by resort to a writ of certiorari. (See Estate 
of Hanley, 23 Ca1.2d 120, 122-124 [142 P.2d 423, 149 A.L.R. 
1250] ; Palomar Refining Co. v. Prentice, 47 Cal.App.2d 572, 
573 [118 P.2d 322].) No circumstances are disclosed that 
would justify petitioner's failure to keep himself informed of 
the court's action on the motion to dismiss. He could have 
become aware of the court's ruling merely by checking the 
minutes of the court. Even a telephone inquiry would have 
disclosed the status of the case. Such a minimum amount of 
diligence would seem to be particularly essential in a case like 
the present one, where the adverse party was entitled to have 
the order in question entered as a matter of course, and where, 
therefore, it was likely that a ruling would be forthcoming 
shortly.1 Having had an appeal available that was lost through 
the running of the time within which to appeal, petitioner 
may not now have certiorari to review the order of dis-
missal. 
Petitioner's reliance on Elder v. Justice's Court, 136 Cal. 
364 {68 P. 1022], and Grinbaum v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. 
528 {221 P. 635], is misplaced. In each case extremely un-
usual circumstances existed that were held to justify issuance 
of the writ, even though there was a right to appeal in the 
first instance. In the Elder case, the aggrieved party not only 
had no notice of the fact that a default judgment had been 
entered .against him, but had no notice or knowledge of the 
time fixed for trial of the dispute or that the matter had been 
called and the motion for default made and granted. In set-
ting aside the judgment, the court held that eertiorari was a 
proper remedy since the statutory requirement for notice of 
the day fixed for trial (Code Civ. Proc., former § 850) had not 
been complied with and defendant had acted with diligence a~ 
tit appear, that detendant's demurrer to the complaint was sustained 
with leave to amend, but that defendant eleeted to stand on the pleadings. 
In auch a ease, although the court may reconsider the demurrer, the de· 
tendant is entitled to have a dismissal entered on motion in the absence 
ot counsel tor plaintiff and without notice to him. (Saddlemir~ v. Stock-
tOll Savill.gs ~tc. Soc., 144 Cal. 650, 655-656 [79 P. 3811; Berri v. 
Superior Court, 43 Ca1.2d 856, 860 [279 P.2d 8].) 
) 
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:-oon as he learned that. the default judgmC'nt. had been entered 
against him. It does not appear that the defendant was negli-
gent in failing to discover entry of the judgment, which, for 
some uuexplained reason, did not occur until over four years 
after the action was commenced. In the Grinbaum case the 
petitioner was adjudged insane in a proceeding in which she 
did 110t appear. She was given no notice of the original pro-
ceedings or of the application for the order or of the hearing 
thereon, as required by statute. (Code Civ. Proc., former 
§§ 1763, 1793.) In answer to the contention that certiorari was 
not a proper remedy to review the order because of the fact 
that an appeal had been available, the court stated: "[I] t is 
obvious from the state of this record that the petitioner neither 
had nor was in any condition to receive notice of the making 
of suell order or of thc defects in the same during the statutory 
time when such appeal might have been taken." (192 Cal. at 
556.) Only two other cases have been found that hold that 
certiorari is a proper remedy when the right to appeal has 
been lost by the running of time due to lack of knowledge of 
the fact that judgment had been entered. (Lee v. Small Claims 
Oourt, 34 Cal.A.pp.2d 1 [92 P.2d 937]; O'Kuna v. Small 
Claims Court, 81 Cal.A.pp. 588 [254 P. 291].) Neither case 
holds, however, that lack of knowledge, in itself, is sufficient 
justification for issuance of the writ. In neither ease is it sug-
gested that the petitioner was in any way negligent in failing 
to discover that judgment had been entered against him. In 
light of the fact that both cases involved small claims judg-
ments, where the time for appeal was extremely short2 and 
where litigants are not permitted to be represented by counsel, 
there was reasonable justification for the failure of the ag-
grieved party to discover the entry of judgment. (See 1 Wit-
kin, California Procedure, 235; 36 Cal.L.Rev. 558, 568.) These 
cases are all clearly distinguishable from the present one, 
where the reason for petitioner's lack of knowledge of the 
order of dismissal was merely his failure to keep himself in-
formed of the status of the case. 
[6a.] Moreover, in cansing the order of dismissal to he 
entered in the minutes by oral direction from chambers, the 
court did not exceed its jurisdiction. The order was entered 
-Formerly,. appeal from such a judgment had to be taken within five 
days of entry of judgment and there was no requirement for notice of 
such entry. In 1951, the statut ... was amended to pro\Oide that au appeal 
may be taken "within 10 days of the mailing [to defendllnt] of' notice of 
entry of judgment." (Code Civ. Proc., ~ 117j.) 
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in the minute:> of the court on the iSallle day that the motion 
to dismiss was made, after the mattcr had uccn properly no-
ticed and a hearing had been held in which thc parties ap-
. peared, in accordance with the judge's instructions to his 
. clerk. Petitioner contends that the trial judge lal'kcd the 
authority to order in chambers that the dismissal be entered 
in the minutes without filing a formal written order to that 
effect. In support of this contention petitioner relies Oil a 
statement in United Railroads v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. 687 
(242 P. 701], that an order granting a new trial can only be 
made by oral pronouncement in open court or by filing a for-
mal written order signed by the judge. In that case, a motion 
for new trial was granted by a formal written order duly 
signed and filed by the judge. It was urged that an order 
granting such a motion could not be effective unless the judge 
"betake himself to the courtroom in which the hearing haJ 
been had and there mount the bench and formany and audibly 
pronounce an order granting the motion for a new trial, and 
that by no other method could snch an order be lawfully 
rendered." (197 Cal. at 692.) The court rejected this con~ 
tention and held that, in addition to the suggested method, the 
method followed by the trial judge was entirely proper. Any 
statement in that opinion implying that these two methods 
are exclusive, however, is dicta, since to decide the matter 
under consideration it was necessary for the court to hold only 
that the method there employed was proper or improper. 
[7] Incidental statements or cOlldusiollS not ncccssary to the 
decision are not to be regarded as authority. (People v. ' 
McAlliste1', 15 Cal.2d 519, 523 [102 P .2d 1072].) [6b] More~ 
over, later cases lend support to the view that the proceduro 
used by the trial judge in the present case is also proper. 
(Dempsey v. Market Street Ry. Co., 23 Cal.2d 110 [142 P.2d 
929] ; Cox v. Tyrone Power Enterprises, Inc., 49 Cal.App.2d 
383 [121 P.2d 829]; Gossm~n v. Gossman, 52 Cal.App.2d 
184 [126 P.2d 178] ; Hackel v. Los A11yeles Ry. Corp., 31 Cal. 
App.2d 228 [88 P.2d 178].) These cases hold that when tho 
court orders the clerk to enter a minute ordep, the order so 
entered in the minutes is a written ordcr of the COUl·t, and no 
formal writing sigHed hy the cOUl·t UllU filt'd with the clerk i;~ 
necessary_ 'Vhet hl-r tile o/'(l.,!·s or llw (,uul't ill those ('ase:; were 
delivered to the clerk in ehulIIhers or from the bench does not 
appear from the puhlished opinions, but 110 significance should 
be attached to that circulllstance. The crucial question in de-
terJllining the proper procedure fur l't'nditioll or an urdcr that 
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has been heard in open court-,ll is whet.her a. written record of 
the di:-;;)(),dllJll or the III'.ltioll j" 111:1d.· II,\" i.ll(· 101lrt. [8] 1'llt> 
act of instructing the clerk to enter the order in the minutes, 
whethe.r in chambers or on the bench, followed by entry in the 
lllinutl's is the i.'~]uiydellt of signing n fOrlltal 0l"(11'1' and filing it 
with the clerk. In Dempsey v. Market Street Ry. Co., 23 Cal. 
2d no [142 P.2d 929], we held that under section 657 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure a written entry in the minutes is 
sufficient when a new trial is granted on the ground of insuffi-
ciency of the evidence. We stated: "Section 657 is subject 
to the construction that there must be a separate, formal, 
written order, in addition to a minute entry . . . but it may 
also be construed as requiring merely that a written record of 
that ground must be made within the to-day period. We feel 
the latter construction is preferable because it accomplishes 
the result intended by the Legislature and at the same time 
conforms to existing practice, retains simplicity and uni-
formity in procedure, and avoids the introduction of an addi-
tional and wholly unnecessary procedural requirement, the 
failure to observe which would render ineffectual the con-
sider.:-d action of a court." (23 Ca1.2d at 114.) 
Since the trial did not exceed its jurisdiction in the present 
. case and an appeal was available to petitioner, the order is 
affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Spence, J., McComb, J., and Peters, J., con-
curred. 
SHENK, J.-I dissent. 
The denial of the relief sought by the petitioner in this 
case is neither required nor justified under the laws of this 
state. The order of the trial court was clearly in excess of 
jurisdiction and resulted in a palpable injustice to the peti-
tioner for reasons for which he was in no way responsible. 
It will be recalled that the petitioner sought to; review and 
annul an order granting a motion to dismiss his complaint. 
·Section 166 of tile Code of Ci"il Procedure, which defines tile powers 
of judges "in chambers," does not apply to the present case. 'I'he 
motion was brought on for hearing pursuant to due and sufficient noti~.e 
tllereof; the hearing on the motion was had in open court, hoth parties 
being pre~el1 t; opportunity was :l!Torue(1 for argument of the merits of 
the motion; anJ the matter was submitted to the court for determination. 
The only ad. done in chamhors was tile instruction by the judge to his 
clerk to enter in the minutes tho final determination of tlle motion. 
It is cOlleedet! that a written orJer signed by the jll<1ge in cham hers i~ 
valid. 
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that he had no notice of such order until the time for appeal 
therefrom had expired. In like circumstances appearing in 
other cases in this state certiorari has properly been held to 
lie as an exception to the strict application of the law in order 
to obtain the writ. 
The court in this case condones the making of an order at 
chambers in an unauthorized manner. The trial judge, in 
. chambers, orally instructed the clerk to enter the order with-
out the formality of a writing signed by the judge. Section 
166 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for the manner 
of making orders at chambers as follows: 
"The judge or judges of the superior, municipal and justice 
courts may, at chambers, in the matters within the jurisdic-
tion of their respective courts: 
"1. Grant all orders and writs which are usually granted 
in the first instance upon an ex parte application, and may, 
at chambers, hear and dispose of snch orders and writs. . . . 
"2. Hear and determine all motions made pnrsuant to Sec-
tions 657 [new trial] or 663 [vacation and entry of other 
jUdgment] of this code; 
"3. Hear and determine all uncontested actions, proceed-
ings, demurrers, motions, petitions, applications, and other 
matters pending before the court. . . ." 
The present order of dismissal is not authorized by any 
provision of section 166. It is not an order made on an ex 
parte application, as provided for in subsection 1, nor is it 
an uncontested action, as provided for in subsection 3. Sub-
section 2 deals with matters not here involved. 
In United Railroads v. Superior Court (1925),197 Cal. 687 
[242 P. 701], the issue before the court was whether an order 
granting a new trial could be made outside of court. At that 
time section 166 did not provide, as it does now, for the 
making of such an order at chambers. The order involved in 
that case, unlike that here involved, was a formal written 
order duly signed and filed by the judge, In rejecting the 
contention that the judge could make an effective order only 
by a pronouncement from the bench in open court in the 
presence of the parties, and in holding that the judge had 
the authority to make an effective order in the- absence of the 
parties or their counsel in the manner employed, the court 
stated: "We are of the opinion tbat, when all of the elements 
antecedellt to sueh an order have been dnly performed and 
when the issue after a hearing thereon duly has been sub-
mitted to the court for its decision, the order of the court 
June 1959] SIMMONS 'V. SUPERIOR COURT 
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thereon may be rendered in either one of two ways: (1) By 
the pronouncement thereof in open court in the manner above 
suggested [an oral pronouncement from the bcnch] ; or (2) by 
the filing with the clerk in the action of a written order of 
court signed by the judge. Of course, when the latter method 
is· followed the signing of the order by the judge does not 
constitute its rendition. . .. It is the filing of the written 
order authenticated by the signature of the judge which con-
stitutes the rendition thereof." (See also Barnett Rosenburg, 
Inc. v. Superior Court, 93 Cal.App. 276 [269 P. 730].) 
After the decision in the United Railroads case section 166 
was amended to make specific provision for the making of 
orders in chambers upon motions for a new trial. (Stats. 1929, 
p. 850.) However, what the court there said as to making of 
orders not provided for in section 166 would not appear to 
be affected by the statutory change. (See Hfrekel v. Los An-
geles Ry. Corp., 31 Cal.App.2d 228 [88 P.2d 178].) The 
order was not made in either of the two modes authorized and 
was in excess of the court's jurisdiction and· void. 
The court holds that the United Railroads case is not con-
trolling because subsequent decisions cited such as Dempsey 
v. Market Street Ry. Co., 23 Ca1.2d 110 [142 P.2d 929]; 
-Gossman v. Gossman, 52 Cal.App.2d 184 [126 P.2d 178] ; Cox 
v. Tyrone Power Enterprises, Inc., 49 Cal.App.2d 383 [121 
P.2d 829], and Hfrekel v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., supra, 31 
Cal.App.2d 228, have assertedly overruled it. But such is 
not the case. It is contended that those cases hold that when 
the court orders the clerk to enter a minute order, the order 
so entered in the minutes is a written order of the court, and 
no formal writing signed by the judge and filed with the clerk 
is necessary. But those cases do not purport to pertain to 
orders made in chambers, as in the present case. Insofar as 
appears from the opinions in the Dempsey, Gossman and 
Cox eases, an order was made in the usual manner in open 
court granting a new trial on the ground of the insufficiency 
of the evidence, and the clerk entered the order in written 
form in the minute book. The question raised' in each of 
these cases was whether such procedure satisfied the require-
ments of section 657 of the Code of Civil Procedure which 
states in part: "When a new trial is granted, on all or part 
of the issues, upon the ground of the illsufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain the verdict or decisioll, the ordel' shall so 
specify this in writing. . . ." The court held in each case 
that the statute did not require a written order signed by 
) 
) 
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the judge and filed with the clerk, but that the minute entry 
by the clerk was sufficient. Those cases are in no way iu{'on-
sistent with the rule in the United Railroads case. That case 
.conceded the validity of an oral pronouncement made in open 
court in the presence of counsel, and was concerned only with 
the manner of making an order at chambers. 
The court's reliance on the Hackel case is even less justified. 
In that case an order granting a motion for a new trial made 
at chambers was affirmed on the ground that such an order 
was one authorized by section 166. In referring to the United 
Railroads case the court in the Haekel case stated: "Appel-
lants contend that a decision on a motion for a new trial can 
be rendered in only one of two ways: (1) By audible pro-
nouncement in open court; or, (2) By the filing with the i 
clerk in the action of a written order, signed by the judgE'. 
The case of United Ra·ilroad$ v. S"pcrior Co-urt, 197 Cal. 687 
[242 P. 701], appears to be authority for the rule above stated. 
However, since the date of the rendition of the decision last 
cited, sections 166 and 167 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
have been amended ... " to provide for the making of an 
order on a motion for a new trial at chambers. The reliance 
of the court on the cases above referred to cannot be justified. 
From the foregoing it must be apparent that the order 
here was not authorized by section 166 as one which may 
be made at chambers. The court does not seek to justify the 
order under section 166, apparently conceding the lack of 
authority for the order under that section by the remark in 
the footnote that section 166 is inapplicable. However, it is 
apparent from the court's recital of facts that the order was 
made at chambers, and it therefore must be concluded that 
it is the court's present intention to provide by judicial legis-
'lation a further instance wherein a judge may make an order 
at chambers in addition to those instances set forth in section 
166 and obviously intended by the Legislature to be exclusive. 
Obviously the court acted in an unauthorized manner in 
making its order and the order was therefo~ void. But 
the petitioner nevertheless has no right to appeal from the 
order, having lost it by the running of time in which to 
appeal. The petitioner's theory of his right to certiorari is 
that the respondent court "has exceeded the jurisdiction of 
such tribunal ... and there is no'appeal, nor ... any plain, 
speedy and adequate remedy." ;(Code Civ. Proc., § 1068.) 
Having had an appeal available a'nd lost it through the run-
ning of the timc within which to appf'al would appear, at first 
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glauce, tl) rt'lllIin' llial. l'crtior:II'i woul,l IInl. li,~. It does not 
appear from the de .. ideu eases, liowCVl'I', I hat certiorari will 
be lo::;t to the ag-grieved party ill all cases where he loses his 
right of appeal due to the lack of notice of entry of the 
judgment and the running of the time within which to appeal. 
In Elder v. Justice's Court (1902),136 Cal. 364 l68 P. 1022], 
the court had before it an application ill certiorari wherein 
the act in excess of jurisdiction was a failure to give statutory 
notice of time and place of trial. Such a notice was held to 
be jurisdictional. That judgment was nevertheless appealable 
but no appeal was taken within time. Contrary to a general 
application of the statutory requirements for certiorari tl1l' 
court held that certiorari was a proper remedy. The cir-
cumstances of that case must be deemed to justify an exception 
to the rule that there be no appeal available before certiorari 
can be resorted to. 
This exception was followed in Grinl>alf.fII v. SILpel'ior Court 
(1923), 192 Cal. 528 [221 P.· 635]. The act in excess of 
jurisdiction which made the order or judgment void was a 
failure to give antecedent statutory notice of the proceedings 
to adjudge one to be an incompetent. The order so adjudging 
her was appealable but no appeal was taken. After the time 
for appeal had run certiorari was held to be a proper remedy. 
In each of the foregoing cases there was no statutory re-
quirement that notice of entry of the order or judgment be 
given and the time for appeal had run before the aggrieved 
party had notice of such entry. 'l'hese cases recognized that 
the general rule is relaxed where the opportunity to appeal 
was lost by reason of lack of knowledge or notice of the void 
judgment or order,without fault on the part of the aggrieved 
party. 
The exception applied in the Elder and Grinbaum cases 
has been applied in later and different situations. In Lee v. 
Small Claims Court, 34 Cal.App.2d 1 [92 P.2d 937], the 
defendant in a small claims court action had notice of the 
proceedings and appeared and defended. A judg1nent adverse i 
to him was entcred but he did not receive notice thereof 
until after time for appeal had expired. The court held that 
certiorari would lie. To the same effect see O'Kuna v. Small 
maims Court, 81 Cal.App. 588' [254 P. 291], wherein the 
court stated that "An exception to thc rule that certiorari 
cannot be resorted to after time for appeal has expired, may 
he found in instances where no llotice of judgment has been 
had until aftt'l' s11eh time hM I'larsrd." In both tlle Lee and 
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O'Knna rBlIPS th(' (~ourt relied on the Elder case. (See also 
JIcr.//c \"'. 8upn'jt)/· Cmu'f, 71 Cal. 545 [12 p, 615]; Kimple 
v. Supcrior COllrt, 66 Cal. 136 L4 P. 1149]; Reyn.olds v. Su-
pet·jor Coud, 64 Cal. 372 [28 P. 121].) 
The majority evidently recognize that there is an exception 
-_ to t~e strict application of section 1068, but they would 110t 
apply the exc('ption in the present case because of purported 
distinctions from those cases where it has been applied. But 
it is not possible to distinguish the Lee and O'Kuna cases. 
In those cases, as in the present case, the aggrieved party 
had notice of the proceedings and of the fact that an order 
or judgment was forthcoming. Yet they made no inquiries 
,vhen they received no notice of judgment until after time 
for appeal had expired. The fact that shorter periods of times 
were involved in which to take an appeal in those cases should 
have made them all the more vigilant and less entitled to 
certiorari than the petitioner in the present case. 
The exception to the statutory requirement that there be 
no appeal available is founded on equitable principles. Cer-
tiorari is an ancient and extraordinary writ growing out of 
the English Court of Chancery where, in reflecting the con-
science of the sovereign equitable principles were applied. 
(See Appellate Review in California with the Extraordinary 
Writs, 36 Cal.L.Rev. 75, 78,) It was brought into this state 
in the Constitution of 1849 by providing therein that the, 
Supreme Court "shall have power to issue all other writs 
necessary to the exercise of [its] appellate jurisdiction .... " 
(Const., art VI, § 4.) This power was made specific by amend-
ment of the same section in 1862 and was incorporated in. 
the same numbered section in the Constitution of 1879. The 
application of certiorari has often been tempered by equitable 
considerations. (Smith v. Su~rior Court, 97 Cal. 348 [32 
P. 322] ; Estate of Glassgold, 97 Cal.App.2d 859 [218 P.2d 
1016] ; Swars v. Cou'lldl of the City of Vallejo, 64 Cal.App.2d 
858 [149 P.2d 397].) 
In the present case the principles of justice and equity 
may best be served by bringing the petitioner lVithin the ex-
ception to the general rule. 
The order should be annulled. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied July 
22, 1959. Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion 
that the application should be granted. 
